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DTU, Denmark 
 
Abstract 
The concept “simple accidents” is understood as traumatic events with no more than one victim. In 
the last 10 years many European countries have seen a decline in the number of fatalities, but there 
still remain many severe accidents at work. In the years 2009-2010 in European countries 2.0-2.4 
million occupational accidents a year were notified leading to 4500 fatalities and 90,000 permanent 
disabilities each year 
The article looks at the concept “accident” to find similarities and distinctions between major 
and simple accident characteristics. The purpose is to find to what extent the same kinds of 
prevention or safety methodologies and procedures established for major accidents are applicable to 
simple accidents.  
The article goes back to basics about accidents causes, to review the nature of successful 
prevention techniques and to analyze what have been constraints to getting this knowledge used 
more broadly. This review identifies gaps in the prevention of simple accidents, relating to safety 
barriers for risk control and the management processes that need to be in place to deliver those risk 
controls in a continuingly effective state. 
The article introduces the “INFO cards” as a tool for the systematic observation of hazard 
sources in order to ascertain whether safety barriers and management deliveries are present. Safety 
management and safety culture, together with the knowledge included in the INFO cards are 
important factors in the prevention process. 
The conclusion is that we must look at safety as a part of being a professional in all kinds of jobs 
and occupations as well as at management level.  
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Introduction 
The concept “simple accidents” is understood as traumatic events with usually no more than one 
victim in contrast to major accidents. The use of the term “simple accidents” is intended to 
underline that this kind of accident is perceived as trivial, common or traditional, and that such 
accidents seem to be rather simple to explain, both as to why they happen and when they happen. 
These accidents result primarily in injuries with minor consequences, but also once in a while 
people may be more seriously harmed and the consequences may turn fatal. Most occupational 
accidents are simple and happen in all occupations, sectors and countries - more or less everywhere.  
Through the last 10 years many European countries have seen a decline in the number of 
fatalities, but there still remain many severe accidents at work. In the years 2009-2010 in European 
countries 2.0-2.4 million occupational accidents a year were notified (Eurostat, 2013) leading to 
about 4500 fatalities and about 90,000 permanent invalidities each year (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
These worrying statistics need to be discussed taking into account the developments in the field 
of occupational health and safety. Safety legislation has been growing continuously for the last 50-
60 year, making employers the main ones responsible for their employee’s safety. Safety 
organizations have been established and specific regulations have been established for many types 
of hazards and activities. Frequent safety campaigns are a prioritized support activity by authorities 
and insurance companies. Safety training and education courses have been established and 
technology has improved remarkably with regard to in-built safety. However, the costs of injuries 
from occupational accidents for EU 15 is still estimated at 55 billion euros (Eurostat, 2004). Other 
cost calculations tell stories of great costs for both employers, employees and the broader society 
(Gavious, et al., 2009), (Rikhardsson & Impgaards, 2004), (Labour Organisation in Denmark, 
2010), (Eurostat, 2004). If employees, employers, the regulatory authorities or politicians are asked, 
then all agree that nobody should be injured when they are at work and certainly not be made 
permanently disabled or get killed. Furthermore they agree that it is better to prevent than to cure. 
The question then is why we still see so many occupational accidents happening again and again. 
What do we miss or have not understood about how to avoid these accidents? 
 
This paper is divided into three parts: 
Part 1will look at the concept “accident” to find similarities and distinctions between major and 
simple accident characteristics. The purpose is to find to what extent the same kind of prevention or 
safety methodologies and procedures established for major accidents are applicable for simple 
accidents. 
Part 2 will go back to basics about accidents causes, to review the nature of successful 
prevention techniques and to analyze what have been constraints to getting this knowledge used 
more broadly. To do this we will start our description of the causes of occupational accidents with 
the injury and its consequences and go back in the causal sequence through the immediate, proximal 
causes to the root causes. This review will identify gaps in the prevention of simple accidents, 
relating to safety barriers for risk control and the management processes that need to be in place to 
deliver those risk controls in a continuingly effective state. A safety barrier is understood to be a 
physical and/or behavioral barrier blocking the development of a scenario from becoming a loss of 
control and leading to harm. They include technical safety barriers that need to be provided, used, 
maintained and monitored as well as behavioral safety barrier covering procedures, plans, rules, 
availability, manpower, competence, commitment, conflict resolution, coordination and 
communication. (Hale & Guldenmund, 2003)  
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Part 3 introduces a proposal for how to cover the gaps found in part 2, relating to information 
about hazard sources, safety barriers and management delivery systems for different risks. This will 
present the concept of “INFO cards” as a tool for the systematic observation of hazard sources in 
order to ascertain whether safety barriers and management deliveries are present. 
Part 4 looks at the problem of getting safety to be prioritized in a company and the need for 
integration at all levels of the hierarchy. Safety management, safety culture and safety climate, 
together with the knowledge included in the INFO cards are important factors in this process. 
(Glendon, et al., 2007), (Hale A.R., 2010), (Jørgensen, 2002), (Zohar, 2008). 
The conclusion will be that we must look at safety as a part of being a professional in all kinds of 
jobs and occupations as well as at management level. 
1: The concept “accident” 
Accident models and theories in safety and prevention have traditionally treated accidents as all 
of the same kind. Nevertheless, there has sometimes been a distinction made between major 
accidents and occupational accidents in the sense that some theories, models and cause analyses 
have been based either on major accidents or on occupational (simple) accidents. But the 
definitions, the causal modelling and analyses and the discussions about preventive measures seem 
to treat accidents as all of one kind. We need to look a bit more closely at the phenomenon 
“accident” to untangle this. 
 
1.1.  Definition 
The definition of an accident has been formulated in many ways throughout history. However, 
an analysis of different accident models shows that three elements are always to be found in 
models; the description of the causes, the events leading up to them and the consequences (the 
injury or damage) (Jørgensen, 1982). The causes are most often described as multiple and 
sequential; the events as sudden, unexpected and unplanned and the consequences as harm to 
people, materials, production or other values (Kletz, 2002), (Sklet, 2004), (Jørgensen, 1982), 
(Eurostat, 2002), (Eurostat, 2013). The main difference between the definition of major accidents 
and that of simple, occupational accidents is that major accidents have consequences not restricted 
to the immediate occupational area and are characterized by harm to many people, valuables and 
materials, while occupational accidents happen at work and normally have consequences for only 
one person. 
 
1.2.  Frequency and seriousness 
Major hazards can therefore be defined as events resulting in very severe consequences. Exactly 
because of these potentially severe consequences a lot of effort has been, and has to be, taken to 
obtain the lowest possible probability for such an accident, often through technologically complex 
and tightly coupled systems with a high degree of control and defense-in-depth, developed through 
predictive analyses. As and when a major accident happens a lot of effort has been put into 
identifying causes and cause –consequence relations driving a learning process aimed at removing 
causes (Sklet, 2004), (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000), (Rasmussen, 1997). 
Simple occupational accidents have a much higher frequency and have in fact killed or 
permanently injured more people in total than all the major accidents which have occurred. 
Nevertheless, the consequences for each individual occupational accident can be seen as minor 
compared to the major accidents. However this is only according to a view from society or the 
regulator; for the victims it does not make any difference whether they are killed or maimed alone 
or as one of a crowd. The types of hazards and causes leading to occupational accidents and injuries 
are many and complex and occur often in loosely coupled (work) systems. Most importantly, these 
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systems are believed to be controllable by the victims or those close to them by removing the root 
causes, identified often by statistical analysis as their errors. (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). The 
question is if that is true. 
 
1.3. Hazard information 
Frequency and seriousness are also a question of who is at risk, when, where and in what 
situations and with what probability a given type of accident can lead to serious consequences. 
Hazards regarded as major hazards are largely connected to processes, technologies, and materials 
with well-defined hazards such as explosions, crashes or collapses, which we can easily locate 
(Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000), (Sklet, 2004), (Stoop & Roed-Larsen, 2009). Major hazards are, for 
the same reason, controlled, or at least isolated technologically and are surrounded with procedures 
and rules in tightly coupled systems to control the hazard (Bird & Germain 1985), (Glendon, et al., 
2007), (Hale & Guldenmund, 2003), (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000), (Sklet, 2004), (Stoop & Roed-
Larsen, 2009), (Perrow, 1984) 
In contrast to the strong focus on major hazard prevention, the many types of occupational 
hazards are so common in every work process that most people hardly think about them. These 
include a fall when walking on stairs or from a ladder, injury to the back or other body part when 
handling a load, or coming into contact with a knife or other sharp tool, etc. These are called 
“simple hazards” (Jørgensen, et al., 2010). They are hazards all of which can lead to serious or fatal 
injuries for the individual, but they are also hazards that individuals seldom recognize as resulting in 
such injuries. They are the kinds of hazards so commonly found that people have largely learned to 
deal with them without getting injured. They are therefore seen not as hazards to be eliminated, or 
tightly technologically controlled, in the same way as major hazards, but as within the control of the 
potential victims, and therefore their own fault if things eventually go wrong. They are latent 
hazards that can be seen as a kind of sleeping hazards, one that people are unable to perceive or 
where it takes an unusual set of circumstances to be present for the hazard to manifest itself as an 
incident with harm. Given the general experience that everybody knows very well how these 
hazards should be handled, Carin Sundström-Frisk expressed the view that people can work day in 
and day out in such a hazardous environment. Through their thoughtfulness, ingenuity, attention 
and physical abilities they can compensate for poorly designed equipment, facilities and routines, 
and thus prevent the risks being triggered (Sundström-Frisk, 1985), (Jørgensen, 1982).  
 
1.4. Accident investigations 
Various detailed methods have been developed for the analysis of accidents, but they are used 
primarily in relation to the major accidents (Sklet, 2004), (Katsakiori, et al., 2009). The norm is that 
an investigation team is established to investigate a major accident and every observation, statement 
and evidence is written down for in-depth analyses. 
Occupational accidents are mainly investigated by the regulatory authorities to assign 
responsibility or by the company safety organization, in the best cases to drive prevention, but 
mostly only for statistical purposes. Investigations of occupational accidents lead mainly to short 
descriptions of the consequences, the mode of injury and the harmful agent that caused the injury, 
with sometimes information about the deviations occurring. If the consequences are minor and the 
event seems to be simple, most often time and resources are not put into more investigation. Hence 
the information from simple occupational accidents is very often only recorded in statistics for 
either the company or the authorities. This information is mostly used to "measure" the level of 
safety rather than for the purpose of learning to improve preventive controls. This drives a vicious 
circle, that, despite being relatively so common, they are not seriously investigated to understand 
why they still occur so relatively frequently and their prevention is seen as simple; without that 
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investigation, they are seen as the fault of the victims and hence not that of the management; with 
the result that their underlying causes are not investigated and addressed. 
In recent years different initiatives have begun to be taken to developed methods to analyze 
occupational accidents much more deeply. These include “Tripod” (Pietersen, 2006), the “Danish 
Safety Organization analysis method” (Jørgensen, 2011) and the “Dutch Storybuilder” (Bellamy, et 
al., 2007). However, it seems that only large companies with a dedicated safety department have the 
ability to put such methods to use. 
The primary learning from the occupational accidents investigated by regulators and contained in 
the official statistics focus mainly on establishing whether the occurrence was a breach of the law. 
Different small-scale research on specific branches or activities has shown results on linkage from 
consequences to the root causes (e.g. Hale, et al., 2012), but the only notable, large-scale project 
which has been undertaken is the Dutch ORCA project where over 20,000 serious injuries were 
analyzed using the bowtie method and in which the essential safety barriers for 64 types of hazards 
are described (Ale, 2006), (RIVM, Worm Metamorphosis Consortium, 2008), (Bellamy, 2010).  A 
bowtie is an analysis methodology that analyses an accident from the critical event, e.g. a fall from 
a ladder, with a fault tree analyses on the left side of the loss of control and consequence analyses 
on the right side.  
It is paradoxical that people seem to perceive that occupational safety measures are based on 
empirical data, but in practice (with the rare exceptions cited above) this is not the case. 
 
1.5. Blame and guilt 
A further difference between the major accidents and simple accidents is the question ‘who do 
we consider responsible for accidents, if and when they happen’. It seems that major accidents are 
so complex and concern so many people that the “blame” (certainly in the last 50 years) has been 
placed at the level of the organization behind the process (Kletz, 2002). In contrast to this, for 
occupational accidents we have a tendency to blame the victim and so absolve the organization 
from its responsibility. It is a more or less common agreement that 90 % of this kind of accidents 
are caused by human mistakes and poor behaviour (Heinrich, 1959). An opposing view to this 
argument can be found in the work of Carin Sundström-Frisk (1985) who concluded that we do not 
have as many accidents as might be expected, precisely because of the human factor; that people are 
actually very good at maintaining their safety using their human qualities. 
 
1.6. Risk awareness and risk aversion 
We can also look at our risk awareness and estimation of risk. Many studies (e.g. Lin et al 2007, 
Slovic 2000, Slovic et al. 1981, Hale & Glendon 1987) have shown us how people tend to 
overestimate the risks that have a high potential to be fatal. These are risks that are seen as 
technologically complex, scientifically unknown, where people are involuntarily exposed, where 
the risk is controlled by others, where the risk or the consequences are dealt with irresponsibly or 
where the risk is memorable from recently-occurring accidents. The risks that are underestimated 
are the normally non-fatal risks, where exposure is seen to be voluntary, where the risks are 
scientifically well known, risks that can be controlled or dealt with responsibly, where the 
consequences are reversible and the risk is not dramatic or memorable. These findings show that 
awareness is more about feelings than about knowledge or objective risk assessments and the 
prevention efforts and safety activities have to take this into account (Lin & Petersen, 2007). 
 
1.7. Conclusion to part 1 
The conclusion to this brief review is that the definition of an accident can be used for all kind of 
accidents as a phenomenon, but the conditions for prevention for different types of accident have 
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major differences in frequency and seriousness, hazard information, the depth of their investigation, 
the blame allocated and the risk awareness of those concerned. 
2: The nature of successful prevention techniques 
Accident causation models have been expressed in many forms, going from the sequence of 
event (Andersson, 1994) to representation of the whole system (Katsakiori, et al., 2009). But they 
have all dealt more or less with the following issues (Andersson, 1991), (Bird & Germain, 1985), 
(Feyer & Williamson, 1994), (Groeneweg, 1996), (Hale, et al., 1997), (Koornneef & Hale, 1995), 
(Raouf, 1994), (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000), (Jørgensen, 2002), (Zohar, 2010), (Reason, 1997): 
1. The consequences - the injury and the victim,  
2. The critical event - deviation and harmful agent  
3. The immediate causes most often related to the work situation and the victims’ 
behaviour, and the safety barriers or risk control measures introduced to control these causes.  
4. The root causes related to management conditions and processes delivering controls.  
 
Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) identified two further levels extending the above with:  
5. The management’s strategic prioritization and commitment  
6. External conditions such as legislation, competition, market relations, stakeholder 
requirements etc. 
The sequence is presented in the order in which the causes are usually dealt with in an 
investigation, from the proximal to the distal causes. These 6 stages in their reverse, causal order are 
distinct in time and place but also represent 6 stages in the hierarchy of decisions and power, from 
the employee to the line managers and middle managers, further to the top management and the 
external forces. I will go through these 6 stages to see briefly what we know of them from research 
about occupational accidents; whether and what we know things from research about major 
accidents that can be adopted in prevention of occupational accidents and what have been the 
constraints in practice for the prevention of the risks and the creation of safety. 
 
2.1. The consequences –the victim and the injury  
When people have already been involved in an accident with injury the important thing to do is 
to provide the best treatment and best recovery possible. First aid and immediate treatment are 
important and call for a first aider, a physician and/or an ambulance and a well-functioning hospital 
system. Also the insurance systems are important to mitigate additional financial harm to the 
victims and their families. Occupational injuries have been monitored through notification systems 
for more than 100 years and through hospital surveys for at least 50. The consequences for victims 
are well known. As a result of occupational accidents victims get wounded, break their bones, strain 
their muscles and backs, get poisoned, get burned etc. The seriousness of the injury is measured in 
different ways either through the type of injury, the sick leave or grade of incapacity. In the last 15 
years research on the cost to the victim and to the enterprise has documented that occupational 
injuries are relatively rather expensive and it seems to be a win-win situation to raise the safety 
level for both the employees, the employers as well as society (Eurostat, 2004), (Rikhardsson & 
Impgaards, 2004), (Gavious, et al., 2009). 
 
2.2. The critical event – the deviation and the harmful agent 
The harmful agents in the critical events leading to most simple accidents are well known by 
most people e.g. a knife can cut, a fall can hurt, a collision can wound, chemicals can be toxic, fire 
can give burns, etc. To protect people from being injured in the case of a critical event different 
kinds of personal protective equipment and/or technical protection equipment have been developed 
8 
 
 
and used. But this is shutting the door after the horse has bolted; the etiology of critical events is 
actually much more complex. The fact is that most hazards will not injure anybody most of the 
time, because they are observed and taken care of by people’s behavior. These are therefore a kind 
of sleeping hazard. The critical event will occur only when several precursors happen at the same 
time and in the right combination (Hollnagel, 2008), (Jørgensen, 2011). It is the simultaneous 
combination of disparate causes that results in a critical event. For people to be aware of what may 
happen simultaneously and in combination is really difficult and very seldom communicated to 
them. 
To avoid being injured depends on people’s ability to recognize these simultaneously occurring 
potential combinations of causes. They need to understand that the situation is then relatively much 
more dangerous. They have to be able to do this in time to act and must know how to act and have 
the ability to take the action. The questions are: What must they be able to see, can they understand 
what they see and do they know what to do. 
 
2.3. The immediate causes  
The immediate causes relate to the explanation for what made the critical event happen at that 
moment. This is most often connected to either unsafe conditions at the workplace, unsafe acts or 
chance variation (Heinrich, 1959), (Jørgensen, 1982), (Reason, 1997), (Zohar, 2010), (Jørgensen, 
2002), (Hollnagel, 2002).  
Unsafe conditions in the working situation can be related to the design of the work situation or 
its surroundings, to products, equipment, devices, environment, etc. Lack of ergonomic design, 
good plans for the work, maintenance of equipment and housekeeping of the workspaces are some 
of the causes leading to poor working situations (Jørgensen, 2002).  
Unsafe acts have been classified into different human failure types (Reason, 1990). We see slips, 
lapses and mistakes in the simple accidents as well as intended unsafe acts, which come from the 
motivation to get the work done more quickly and/or with less inconvenience (Rasmussen & 
Svedung, 2000).  
 
2.4. The root causes 
Most accident analysis for simple accidents stops at the preceding stage of the immediate causes. 
However, it should go on to question how we could anticipate human failures, as things that relate 
to lack of knowledge and awareness about hazards, lack of ability to foresee and react to hazards 
and lack of motivation to take care of the hazards because, among other things, injuries seldom 
happen to individuals (Sundström-Frisk, 1985).  
Important underlying issues are the need to have a dialogue between workers at the sharp end 
and the management (designers, operations, maintenance, etc.) about hazards, to identify and assess 
them and to control them. However it is difficult to find research that tells us about what hazards 
there are in what situations and how to identify and assess the simultaneous occurrences of 
precursors which characterize these sleeping hazards. This raises questions about what it is that the 
frontline supervisors need to observe and have dialogue with the workers about and where do they 
get this knowledge from? 
If it is so that the sleeping hazards are difficult to observe and the simultaneous combination of 
causes (that may differ from time to time) are difficult to recognize and understand in time to react, 
what could be done instead in advance? Could it be to observe that the safety barriers are in place 
and used? In this case how do we teach workers to observe the safety barrier, to understand how 
important it is that the safety barriers are maintained and used correctly and to act if the safety 
barriers are missing or are inappropriate? 
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The root causes relate to the management processes delivering the barriers or risk controls that 
influence the immediate causes in the working situation as well as employees working conditions 
including the workers’ ability to react and behave as needed. These management deliveries are the 
processes of design, procurement, installation and maintenance of equipment, the recruitment, 
training and manpower planning of employees, their motivation and resolution of potential conflicts 
between safety and other objectives, and communication and planning of groups to coordinate their 
prevention tasks. The root causes are connected at the middle level or the daily routine in an 
organization linked to the staff and line function delivering the crucial resources and controls to 
safety critical tasks at the lower level (Hale, 2005), (Hale & Guldenmund, 2004). The root causes 
are recognized as gaps, inadequacies or un-prioritized parts of these management deliveries that 
have an influence on making the immediate causes possible. But do these line and middle managers 
know what to look for and what is needed? 
If the workers have to observe, use and maintain safety barriers, then the managers must provide 
those safety barriers and ensure that they are purchased, used and maintained. The managers must 
also provide the managerial safety processes so that the workers have plans and goals to follow, 
have resources enough to carry out the work, have the competences to use the safety barriers 
effectively, have dialogue and communication about the work situation and the conflicts that may 
occur. This requires that the managers knows what safety barriers they have to observe as their own 
responsibility, what is needed if the safety barrier is not in place and what they must do to act when 
needed.  
The workers must act in the working situation they are in, but the manager has to act in advance 
to prepare and provide the optimum working situation for the worker. 
  
2.5. The management’s strategic prioritization and commitment  
Senior managers are concerned with policy making and the establishment of procedures to 
facilitate policy implementation, while supervisors at lower hierarchical levels execute these 
policies and associated procedures through daily decisions and routine interaction with employees. 
(Zohar, 2008). The importance of top management support for successful safety performance and 
change is almost universally demonstrated or claimed (Hale, et al., 2010), (Shannon, et al., 1997), 
(Robson, et al., 2007). Different books and research results tell how important the managers’ 
engagement and commitment towards safety is for the creation of a safety culture (Antonsen, 2009). 
Creating a good safety culture and safety climate is part of the discussion about the safety 
management system. 
The top manager must also ensure training to the line managers in such a way that they can fulfil 
their motivating roles towards employees that energize the safety interventions (Hale, et al., 2010). 
It is the top manager who decides whether to invest in hazard prevention, control systems, safety 
instructions, behaviour-based programs etc., whereas supervisors or middle managers can only 
promote the use of such things once they become available (Zohar, 2010). 
The top manager must know what kind of training the middle managers need and what 
organizational procedures make both the physical and behavioural safety barriers work in practice.  
 
2.6. External conditions  
Because the simple hazards and simple events are so widely disseminated and so difficult to 
prioritize in companies and at the same time so expensive for the society and unacceptable in 
general, at least in the western world, there has been an expansion of legislative initiatives from 
governments throughout the last 40 years. In this legislation it has become a fundamental rule that 
the employer be targeted as the main person responsible for safety in the company and for the 
establishment of a safety organization and for education of workers and safety representatives. But 
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what has been seen is that this safety organisation is in many companies separated from the line of 
production and safety questions are not a part of the line manager’s daily work or routine (Frick, et 
al., 2000) 
A whole new employment sector has risen to implement and monitor a certified safety 
management system and to measure the level of safety. This measurement is mostly based on lost 
time injuries (LTIs), because they are relatively easy to measure. But the number of LTIs is a poor 
measure of safety, partly because it is possible to manipulate the figures, partly because the level of 
safety and the number of LTIs at a given time do not need to be correlated. The newest fashion is to 
measure the safety culture, but this research shows us that there are a lot of constraints and 
limitations to this approach, notably in relating the measurement taken to the actual safety 
performance (Reniers, 2013), (Hollnagel, 2014). It is the contention of this paper that observation of 
safety barriers could lead to a new and better proactive set of leading indicators. 
 
2.7. Conclusion to part 2 
We know a great deal about what kinds of accidents happen, with what consequences, critical 
events and hazards. We also have a rather good idea that management commitment, driving the 
safety climate and safety culture, means a lot for safety in an organization and both the managers’ 
and the workers’ behaviour. But it seems that there is something in between that is missing. That is 
knowledge about what essential safety measures can be observed, which can be understood and be 
possible to change or respond to proactively. Safety barrier observation (of both the physical and 
behavioural safety barriers) seems to be important for the frontline level, the daily supervisor level 
and the top manager level.  
3: Safety barrier knowledge and INFO cards 
A safety barrier is defined as a system that has been designed and implemented to prevent, 
control or mitigate the propagation of a condition or event into an undesired event (a loss of control 
over the hazard), (Sklet, 2004), (Hollnagel, 2008). Safety barrier have also been described as both 
physical safety barriers and behavioural safety barriers (Hale & Guldenmund, 2003).  
The Dutch program of work by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment developed a 
model for quantifying work activity risks (Ale, 2006). To date the project has analyzed more than 
20,000 occupational accidents with serious injuries using the “Storybuilder” methodology 
(Bellamy, et al., 2007). The analysis used the software Storybuilder to capture the richness of the 
data in a graphical bowtie structure. Structures for 36 hazard types were built resulting in the 
identification of 400 safety barriers. Behind the identified barrier failures there were around 16,000 
organizational failure events across 8 management delivery systems. (Bellamy, et al., 2010), 
(RIVM, Worm Metamorphosis Consortium, 2008). 
A significant element in the analyses in Storybuilder and subsequent “bowties" is the 
identification of which safety barriers have failed or not been present, which has led to the accidents 
happening. In some cases the safety barriers are easy to understand and review, while in other cases 
they require more detailed information. One example of a complex safety barrier is the one that 
ensures that the support for scaffolding is in order. Here, the safety is dependent upon the 
correctness or adequacy of the surface condition, the support’s surface and placement, the presence 
of a spacing support and its distance etc. Simpler barriers are personal protective equipment and 
machinery guarding, but even these need to meet defined quality and suitability criteria. 
It is also necessary not only to identify that the safety barriers are in place but also that they are 
of a suitable quality and which factors are relevant to this quality. The factors that have an influence 
on the quality of the safety barriers, and hence have an influence on the likelihood of an accident 
occurring, have been given the designation PIEs, which stands for “Probability Influencing Entity”, 
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that is to say factors that can influence the likelihood of failure. For example the PIE´s for the 
stability of a ladder can be how the ladder is anchored, how the ladder is secured from sliding, how 
the ladder is prevented for being knocked against, etc.  The PIEs can also be understood as the 
quality parameter of the safety barriers. The idea is that if all PIEs are completely in order, then the 
safety barriers are also and therefore the risk of an accident is at its lowest given the intrinsic 
effectiveness of the barrier. If some of these PIEs are faulty, not in order or not in place, then the 
safety barrier is bad and the risk of an accident is higher (Ale, 2006), (Jørgensen, et al., 2010). 
The 36 bowties resulted in the identification of 64 types of critical events or hazard sources. For 
each of these hazard sources the failures of the primary and supporting safety barriers were 
identified; for each safety barrier the PIEs were also identified.  
This project represents maybe the only systematic documentation of the safety barriers needed 
against simple accidents. The project also made documentation of how to evaluate the requirements 
of the managerial delivery systems relating to the safety barriers needs. It is important to note that 
different hazard sources need several different safety barriers and that the different safety barriers 
need different management delivery systems (Bellamy, 2010). 
The Storybuilder analyses start from the critical event, identify the lack of physical safety 
barriers, then the lack of the provision, use, maintenance and monitoring (PUMM) of the barriers 
and finally link this to the management delivery system (MDS) which failed to support that PUMM. 
These MDSs are plans and procedures, equipment, ergonomic design, availability of people, 
competences, communication, motivation and conflict resolution between tasks. 
Risk assessment has to go in the opposite direction from the investigation process described in 
the 6 stages in part 2, starting from what the manager has to observe, understand and act on and 
leading to what the worker has to observe and understand and act on. For the senior and middle 
manager this must start with the knowledge of what kind of MDSs and PUMMs are most important 
for ensuring that the different safety barriers are in place and the quality of the safety barrier and the 
PIEs themselves.  
The question is how we can make this valuable information available for many different users, 
both managers and workers, in an easy way. The idea is to create “information (INFO) cards” for 
different kinds of hazard sources with the purpose to identify: 
 What is to be observed? What are the safety barriers? This concerns primary questions about 
whether a safety barrier is provided and whether it is used correctly. 
 What is to be assessed? What are the quality parameters to be evaluated? This covers the need 
to provide the safety barrier, to maintain a safety barrier in good operation and the need for 
instruction of the user about the safety barrier. 
 What should be done, given deficiencies that are discovered? This covers the action to be 
taken to provide a missing safety barrier, to maintain a failing safety barrier and to provide 
instruction and motivation for the correct use of a safety barrier (Jørgensen, et al., 2010). 
In order to accomplish this the employer and the workers need to be able to observe, assess and 
act in advance before the employees start on their work tasks. To do this two sets of INFO cards 
have therefore been devised:  
1. The first set is aimed at employers and supervisors, to ensure that they will identify where 
safety barriers are needed and will provide adequate safety barriers in advance, ensuring that 
they are in place before work starts.  
2. The second set is aimed at employees, to ensure that the safety barriers provided are 
properly used, maintained and monitored during the course of their work.  
In doing this we are able to shift our focus from risks that may be difficult to observe and 
control, to a focus on the safety barriers that lend themselves much more to being observed and 
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controlled. That is to say, the risk assessment and auditing, etc. are able to look at control through 
the safety barriers and their quality parameters (PIEs) including the management delivery system. 
 
3.1. Development of a set of generic INFO cards  
The basis for the development of INFO cards must be information about the different hazard 
sources, the safety barriers and the connected PIEs, PUMMs and MDS. To investigate and form the 
questions for the generic INFO cards the triangle of knowledge, ability and willingness (Bloom, 
1965), (Sundström-Frisk, 1985) was of great help. The knowledge concerns what is in the 
employees´ heads – do they know and understand what they have to do; ability concerns the 
characteristics of the task and the requisite human skills that make it possible for the employees to 
do what they have to do (demands and capacities); and willingness concerns the employee’s 
motivation to do the task (properly).    
Whether the safety barrier has been properly resourced by the MDS has therefore to be observed, 
evaluated and acted upon according to the knowledge, skills and motivation needed.  
The challenge for the development of the INFO card is on the one hand to make it easy and 
available for users (workers and managers) and on the other hand to cover all hazard sources and all 
connected information. If you make such a system short and easy then it often becomes too general, 
but to cover all can be just too unmanageable. Going through all of the safety barriers we can see 
that some are very generic and appear in nearly all hazard types while other safety barriers are 
generic for subgroups of hazard sources and finally some are very specific for specific hazards. For 
this reason the INFO cards were developed in three steps, to avoid too much repetition of the same 
questions:  
1. This covers what has to be observed, evaluated and acted on in general for all risk situations as 
a generic option for both the employer and the employee. This covers the generic safety 
barriers that are needed in more or less all kinds of risk situations, like technical safeguarding, 
personal protective equipment, operational control, avoidance of danger zones, emergency 
response, employees in a healthy condition. The generic INFO card collects these kinds of 
general options.  Figure 1 shows the employer version of the generic INFO card. 
 
                                                               Figure 1 about here 
 
2. This covers what has to be observed, evaluated and acted on for subgroups of hazard sources 
where the task cannot be explicitly described in terms of the very specific hazards that may 
arise. The cross-cutting safety barriers are the generic safety barriers for all of the hazard 
sources included in the subgroup. The subgroups of activities and critical events used are 
given in Table 2. Figure 2 shows the employer version of the cross-cutting safety barrier for 
falls to a lower level.  
 
                                                               Figure 2 about here 
 
3. This covers what has to be observed, evaluated and acted on for the specific hazards which 
require very specific safety barriers for their control.  These specific safety barriers for specific 
risks are a précis of each single risk, based on single Storybuilder factsheets (e.g. 36 
Storybuilder bow-ties or 64 risk bow-ties). Figure 3 shows the employer version of the specific 
INFO cards for falls from a vehicle. 
 
                                                           Figure 3 about here 
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Table 2 shows the identification of the 64 specific types of critical events or hazard sources and 
their division into sub groups as follows:  
The first sub-division consists of the characteristics of 4 main different risk situations: 
A. The surface that is being walked on or worked on, covering the risk of falling. 
B. The surroundings that are being travelled in or worked in covering the risk in the 
surroundings of something colliding with you from outside, or of colliding with 
something. 
C. What is being worked with or on, covering the risks of becoming caught up in/wedged in 
something, stabbing yourself, cutting yourself, straining yourself. 
D. The surroundings of a particularly dangerous nature covering conditions that require 
particular vigilance, such as fire and explosion, electricity and lack of oxygen. 
The second level of division consists of 17 subgroups of activities and connected critical events or 
hazards sources. The third level consists of the 64 types of hazard sources.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The basic reason for dividing the INFO cards into three types is to help the enterprises going 
from the general level to the more specific level with the possibility to choose when to use the 
subgroup level and when to use the specific level as “a pick up and use” possibility. The idea is also 
to provide the enterprises with a systematic view of what hazard sources need to be controlled by 
what safety barriers and management delivery systems.   
 
3.2. How should a company use INFO cards?  
A company must first examine its own activities in order to determine which risks require 
(improved) awareness and prevention. This should be done through incident analysis, risk 
assessment, analysis of employee experience and perceptions, etc. Knowledge from national or 
enterprise statistics, published facts and figures can be helpful for describing the most important 
risks, as well as attention to the company’s own history of incidents.  
Knowing this, the company can take the following steps: 
1. Go through the generic INFO cards assessing what they already have and what they need to 
supply additionally in the organization. 
2. Take the most important cross cutting INFO cards covering risks that represent many work 
places or many different work situations in the company and assess what needs to be supplied in 
their (daily) control and supervision. 
3. Follow the specific INFO cards covering any specific risks that exist in special tasks, 
workplaces or work situation and identify the supervisors and workers who need the related 
knowledge, ability to act and motivation. 
This way the company can use a sample of INFO cards that cover the risks of which it is most 
important for the company to improve its control. To tailor them to a specific company, it may be 
necessary to include the special names of technologies or technical terms and sometimes more 
detailed specifications will be needed to give exact checks of barriers. For example it would not be 
enough to have a safety barrier for a pipeline telling that rust must be monitored; more information 
of how to monitor and how to detect would be necessary. 
The next step would be to introduce the use of the customized INFO card for the company, 
which probably requires a targeted approach where performance management and change 
management will provide useful governance. The INFO cards can also be a valuable input for 
auditing, daily dialogue, training sessions as well as in assessment of risks. 
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3.3. Conclusion to part 3 
The INFO cards can be seen as another observational risk assessment tool in the line of Energy 
Analysis or FMEA, The difference is that the INFO cards contain the practical and validated results 
from the Dutch “Storybuilder” research (op. cit.), with its very concrete and detailed observations 
and analyses. Furthermore the INFO cards include both physical and behavioral safety barriers 
which are targeted both at the manager and at the employee.  
What has been demonstrated is that different hazard sources need different safety barriers and 
different management delivery processes. This tells us that if we want to minimize the risk of fall 
accidents, we must select safety barriers specific for the risk of falls and deliver the managerial 
activities relevant for those safety barriers, while if we want to minimize the risk of explosion, we 
must choose the safety barrier and management delivery processes relevant for that kind of hazard 
sources. Whilst there are some barriers which are generic across those two hazard types, they are 
few and generic prevention will not solve our risk control problem.  
This puts the discussion about observation of accidents and near accidents as measurement for 
the safety level in perspective. It transfers attention from the unwanted injuries and harm to the 
functioning of the prevention, replacing a reactive with a proactive performance indicator. Also it 
introduces the necessary level of specificity. For example, if the accidents and near accidents which 
are occurring are falls on the same level and the safety initiative set in place is only focused on that 
hazard source, then you may see a better safety for these kind of risks, but it will have absolutely no 
effect on e.g. the risk for explosion. This expands on the conclusion from part 1; accidents are not 
all of a kind, but concern many different risks, with at least 64 hazard sources, which must be 
controlled by different safety barriers and management delivery processes. The Dutch ORCA 
project’s information and the INFO card may be of help in managing this diversity. This message 
may seem trivial once stated, but it is one which has not penetrated sufficiently to prevention 
practice, which may tend to look for panaceas such as safety culture, which it hopes will solve all 
problems in one wave of the magic wand. 
 
4: Discussion 
But – there is always a “but” – as Rasmussen told us 15 years ago, the top manager has other 
duties to prioritize.  The effectiveness of the company, the financial situation, productivity, the 
customers’ need for a low price and fast delivery play a crucial role for the company´s survival and 
growth (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). Safety is only prioritized if it is crucial for the company´s 
survival, or to sustain a profile as a responsible company, or at the lowest level to fulfil legislative 
requirements. 
The knowledge about what good safety management is has primarily been found in larger 
companies with major risks or in very big international companies with a stated goal towards zero 
accidents (Robson, et al., 2007). Very few SMEs are to be found implementing a good safety 
management system.  
Most enterprises are SMEs and most simple accidents happen in SMEs. We know that the 
SME´s resources for safety are limited as well as their own experience with accidents. Small 
enterprises are generally described as simple structures. According to Mintzberg, they are 
characterized by the strategic apex dominating the supervision of the work done by the operating 
core (Mintzberg, 1983). More popularly expressed, it is the employer who sets the agenda, deciding 
which tasks are to be performed and under what circumstances. Limited formalization of decision 
making means that communication routes are short, but there are also limited planning activities 
(Hasle & Limborg, 2004). This results in a great need for, but concomitant lack of, systematic 
management, such as systematic access to working environment management. Small enterprises 
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choose not to participate in these because such a system is too time consuming and expensive and 
does not fit their way of operating (Antonsson & Smidt, 2003). 
In practice in these SMEs, for most traditional work situations an agreed way to do the work has 
been developed informally over time as a part of the professional opinion of how work has to be 
carried out. This is mostly driven by a focus on the quality of the end product and its effectiveness, 
more than on the safety of the process producing that product.  Safety is in most of the traditional 
sectors seen as something that is based on individual behaviour, which often results in belief in the 
expression “you are your own safety officer”. The problem with this is that only very experienced 
people with a good mind for safety will be able to foresee the combinations of circumstances that 
trigger the simple hazards and be able to act successfully in such a hazardous situation.  People who 
can do that must be seen as the true professionals, people who have the competence to make 
judgments of the situation for both the safety and quality of the work. This is the reality we are 
facing when promoting prevention through safety management, safety culture, safety climate, safety 
behaviour etc. 
What if we turn the view around and start with what is needed for a company to survive and to 
make profit? Can we see if we can integrate efforts for reducing injuries and losses in what else may 
be needed in a company? We could also look at what is of importance for the employees, what they 
could be proud to be. 
Others have seen the need for the integration of safety in production. Rasmussen (2000) showed 
us that the management’s wish to obtain the highest effectiveness in organizations and the 
employees’ wish to make the workload easier are two very strong drivers for the drift to danger. 
Others have drawn similar conclusions, that safety should be as equally important a part of an 
organization's mission as being a financial success (Geller, 1994). If management has equal 
attention to productivity and safety, then it exhibits a culture that has the potential to host both 
(Hopkins, 2005). We must ask ourselves how we ensure that effectiveness includes safety and 
quality, and how we ensure that the easy way to perform the job also is the safest and highest 
quality way.  
Several researchers have found that the financial loss from accidents and error in production can 
be tremendous for a company, but also that a high level of safety and quality assurance are related 
to high performance in production in the long run. Financial success is both when you earn more 
money but also when you minimize your losses (Elsier & Nikov, 2003), (EU-OSHA , 2011), 
(Foldspang, et al., 2014). 
In this view of effectiveness you must know what can go wrong both for production, processes 
and financial transactions as well as for safety and quality. This entails knowing how to observe, 
what to observe, how to understand what you see and how to know what to do about it. This can all 
be summarized as a professional attitude to work, its content and context. 
The discussion for the future will be if something like INFO cards could a good help for this 
process concerning the safety question. 
 
5: Conclusion 
The conclusion is that simple accidents, which are caused by simple hazards and simple critical 
events, even though their related injuries can be serious at least for the vistims, are very seldom 
analyzed for root causes. The combination of precursors which characterize the triggering of these 
simple hazards is difficult to observe or be aware of; those on the front line find it difficult to see 
the wood for the trees. The safety barriers for different hazards are different and the management 
delivery processes required to install and keep the barriers functioning also differ for different 
safety barriers. The links between these simple accidents, the critical event leading to them and the 
required safety barriers and management delivery processes have mostly not been communicated to 
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the big group of exposed employees or their responsible supervisors and managers; hence they are 
not aware of, or prepared for their role in prevention. This is also partly because they operate from 
the belief that such accidents are under the control of the victims, so they do not see the need for 
that prevention information and hence they do not even ask for it. What is needed is a structure that 
links for them the different stages in the causal chain and explains their personal role in controlling 
it, so that the information given to them is not too general, or too enormous, nor involving too many 
persons. They also need to be convinced in the end that someone really cares.  
The lessons learnt from research and practice is that: 
1. We know the types of simple accidents, events and hazards including the injury 
frequency and seriousness, but we cannot foresee where and when these accidents will occur 
because of the multiple combinations of causes and hazard distributions. 
2. We know how to protect both human and technological system elements from 
unwanted releases of energy, but not all uncontrolled flows of energy can be protected 
against. 
3. We know that humans’ behaviour is dependent on their knowledge and awareness of 
hazards, their ability and possibility to handle hazardous situations and their motivation to 
behave as a professional; but most hazards are sleeping hazards and when, where and why 
hazardous situation crop up is mostly difficult to foresee. 
4. As researchers and practitioners we know what types of safety barriers are needed for 
the different hazards but this knowledge is not commonly known by those working with 
them. 
5. We know how to design work environments with a high passive safety, but in most 
industries and services especially in SMEs this is seldom utilized. 
6. We know that active safety is based on the line managers’ focus on safety when 
making instructions, plans, coordination and communication, but that is seldom realized in 
practice, especially if decisions about safety issues are placed in a parallel organization 
separated from the production management line. 
7. We know that it is important for the manager to create a high level of safety culture, 
but there is very little knowledge about how to create and measure the manager´s ability to 
do so for the simple accidents and hazards. 
8. We know that management delivery processes are important for the presence and 
quality of safety barriers, but these delivery processes differ from safety barrier to safety 
barrier. It is necessary for managers to know about this, to be able and motivated to ensure 
the delivery, despite the fact it may be in conflict with other important management 
deliveries. 
9. We know that the manager’s commitment and engagement for safety is of great 
importance for how the whole organization prioritizes safety, but other issues like finance, 
customer demands, production, technology, time pressure have most often a higher priority 
for the company to survive. 
It is obvious from the above that we do have a lot of knowledge of what works, but there also 
seem to be many constraints on implementation in most industries and companies especially the 
SMEs.  Simple accidents may be simple to explain once they happen, and it therefore might seem 
that what is understandable for a company should also be simple to prevent. However, nothing 
could be more wrong. Because of the abundance of sleeping hazards, the difficulty is to observe the 
hazardous situation before it is too late, to understand the different needs for safety barrier (incl. 
their continuing maintenance) and management delivery processes.  It is to be hoped that INFO 
cards could be of great help for this purpose. 
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We have to make safety a part of the professionalism of doing a good job, not making safety a 
separate issue, but an integrated part of what are the good and proper ways to do things for both the 
frontline workers, the supervisors as well as the top managers. 
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Table 1. Registered accident at work in 2009-2010 reported to Eurostat from 27 EU countries + Norway 
according to the severity of the accidents and the duration of absence. 
 
Severity: Fatal Permanent 
disability 
3-6 
months 
absence 
1-3 
months 
absence 
14-30 
days 
absence 
4-13 
days 
absence 
Unknown Total 
Year 2009 4,381 98,771 102,116 439,358 604,386 906,396 284,952 2,440,360 
Year 2010 4,567 83,294 83,230 369,126 506,760 744,500 267,600 2,059,077 
Total 8,948 182,065 185,346 808,484 1,111,146 1,650,896 552,552 4,499,437 
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Figure 1. The manager’s generic INFO card covering the generic safety barriers.  
Manager’s generic INFO card 
Observe  Evaluate  Act  
Observe whether… Evaluate the need for….. 
Act to ensure provision, use, 
maintenance and monitoring 
/improvement of safety barriers 
for…. 
Safeguarding is provided and used by the 
employee 
Better safeguarding Safeguarding 
Personal protective equipment is provided 
and used by the employee 
Better personal protective equipment Personal protective equipment 
Operational control of the technical 
system is safely provided and managed 
safely by the employee 
Better operational control system The operational control system 
Avoidance of the danger zone is provided 
for in the task and respected by the 
employee 
Better avoidance of danger zone Avoidance of danger zone 
Emergency response is provided and able 
to be used by the employee 
Better emergency response Emergency response 
The employee's health condition is 
satisfactory and enables them to do the 
task safely. 
Better health monitoring and if it is 
necessary, changing the employee's 
current task 
Employees who are in poor health 
condition ( change the task) 
The employee has the right knowledge 
and skills and is using them correctly 
More training and instruction 
Competence (through training and 
instructions) 
Information about risks and safety barriers 
is communicated to and understood by the 
employee 
Better communication of information 
about risks and safety barriers 
Communication about the risks and safety 
barriers 
Safe equipment is provided and used by 
the employee 
Improving equipment to be in a safe 
condition, right for the task and possible 
to use in a safe way 
Equipment changed to a better and more 
safe product 
Safety is integrated into plans and 
procedures for the task and followed by 
the employee 
Improving plans and procedures so they 
are right for the task and possible to 
follow by the employee in a safe way 
Plans and procedures adapted to be safe 
for the task and to the level of 
understanding of the employee  
Equipment, technical devices, and the 
workplace conditions are provided in an 
ergonomic and safe design and used by 
the employee and maintained 
Improving equipment, technical devices, 
workplace conditions so that they are in a 
proper ergonomic condition 
The ergonomic design of equipment, 
technical devices, work surroundings  
Sufficient and qualified people are 
available for the routine and non-routine 
tasks when needed  
More people or people with other 
qualifications for the tasks (including in 
the night, for emergency response and 
specialist tasks that are rarely carried out)  
The availability of qualified people for all 
the possible task demands  
There is pressure to carry out the task in a 
quicker and less safe way due to conflict 
with operational goals or other tasks 
Removing the conflict situation between 
tasks and goals so that the employee will 
choose to do his task the safe way and 
ensuring the employee is getting the right 
message from management about the 
importance of safety. 
Reduction or removal of the conflict 
between safety and production, ensuring 
that safety is prioritised over production 
goals when they come into conflict 
The employee is motivated to carry out 
the task in a safe way 
Improving the employee's motivation and 
awareness for carrying out the task in an 
acceptably safe way, including improving 
the effectiveness of motivational and 
awareness raising initiatives and 
maintaining alertness on a continuing 
basis 
Motivation and risk awareness of the 
employee for carrying out the tasks in a 
safe way on a continuous basis, including 
the removal of distractions and 
maintenance of alertness  
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Figure 2. The manager’s cross-cutting INFO card for falls from height 
Manager’s cross cutting INFO card for falls from height 
Observe  Evaluate  Act  
Observe whether… Evaluate the need for….. 
Act to ensure provision, use, 
maintenance and monitoring 
/improvement of safety barriers for…. 
Strength of supporting equipment or 
structures when working at  height is in 
good order and clean 
Checking and providing strength and 
cleanliness of the equipment or structures 
when working at height. 
Making sure that structures that have to be 
worked on are strong enough to support persons 
and other loads. 
Maintaining or replacement of the equipment. 
Maintaining strength of structures for working 
at height. 
There is a need for edge protection and if 
so that the edge protection is of good 
quality and correctly installed 
Checking edge protection quality and 
correct installation/fixing in place 
Maintaining or installing edge protection of 
appropriate safe design 
The placing of equipment (including what 
it is placed on) and the possibility for it to 
be affected by external circumstances 
could affect its safe use. 
Adjustment of how equipment is placed 
and the possibility for external 
circumstances which could affect its safe 
use 
The secure placement of equipment  
Maintaining  safeguarding against external 
circumstances that could affect the integrity of 
the equipment 
Competences for using the equipment or 
being at height is provided and used by 
the employee. 
Instruction/training for working at height Maintaining workers´ competences for working 
at height 
Employee is motivated to use the 
equipment or work at height in a safe way 
Motivation actions towards working at 
height 
Maintaining  the motivational activities for safe 
behavior when working at height 
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Figure 3. the managers specific INFO cards for falling from a non-moving vehicle 
Manager’s specific INFO card for falling from non-moving vehicle 
Observe  Evaluate  Act  
Observe whether…. Evaluate the need for…. 
Act to ensure provision, use, 
maintenance and 
monitoring/improvement of safety 
barrier for… 
Equipment strength 
The vehicle is strong enough to support the 
weight 
Limitation of weight Vehicle is strong enough for the weight 
The vehicle is overloaded or loaded one-
sidedly 
Changes to the loading method The correct load and balanced loading methods 
Edge and access protection 
Edge protection is absent, insufficient or has 
been removed or is broken 
Edge protection Adequate edge protection 
The vehicle and the load are safely accessible 
for the required activities 
Changing the access Safe access to vehicle loads 
Equipment placement 
The vehicle placement is stable Changing the placement of the 
vehicle 
Stable placement of vehicle 
Load configuration is stable Changing the load configuration Stable load configuration 
Load displacement/movement/loading or 
unloading threatens user stability or the 
stability of the vehicle 
Changing the 
displacement/movement/ loading 
or unloading procedure 
Displacement/movement/loading or unloading 
procedures to prevent instability 
Employer ability and competences 
The employee is able to keep balance Prevention of loss of balance Being fit enough to balance on the vehicle 
The employee is able to work safely on the 
non-moving vehicle 
Changing the work conditions 
that might cause loss of balance 
Work conditions for preventing loss of balance 
The access behavior is safe Changing access behavior Safe access behavior 
The surface conditions are safe for the 
activity, also with respect to access 
Changing the surface conditions 
that might cause loss of balance 
Safe surface conditions for the activities, also 
with respect to access  
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Table 2. The list of 64 hazard sources and 17 subgroups of critical events and activities 
Characteristics 
of main risk 
situations 
Subgroup 
of activities 
Subgroup of 
critical events 
Specific hazard sources 
A. The surface 
that is being 
travelled on or 
worked on; 
1. Work at 
heights 
Falls from heights 1. Falls from heights - movable ladders 
2 Falls from heights – fixed ladders 
3 Falls from height – stepladders  
4 Falls from heights – rope ladders 
5. Falls from heights – mobile scaffolding 
6. Falls from heights – fixed scaffolding 
7. Falls from heights – erection/dismantling of scaffolding 
8. Falls from heights - roofs 
9. Falls from heights – areas, floors with large differences in 
level 
10. Falls from heights – fixed platforms 
11. Falls into deep holes (e.g. in the earth, floors) 
12 Falls from heights – mobile platforms 
13. Falls from heights – stationary vehicles 
14. Falls from heights – other work at height without 
protection 
 
2. Work at 
the same 
level 
Falls on the same 
level 
15. Risk of stumbling or skidding on the same level 
16. Falls on steps or inclined surfaces 
 
B. The 
surroundings 
that are being 
travelled on or 
worked on; 
3. Falling 
objects 
Being struck by 
falling objects 
17 Being struck by falling objects – cranes or hoists 
18. Being struck by falling objects - mechanical lifting (e.g. 
cranes) 
19. Being struck by falling objects – from conveyances or 
conveyor belts 
20. Being struck by falling objects – from manually lifting 
21. Being struck by falling objects – other objects at height 
 
4.Fragments Being struck by 
fragments 
22. Being struck by fragments – from machinery or hand tools 
23. Being struck by fragments – from objects under pressure/ 
stress 
24. Being struck by fragments – that are blown by the wind 
 
5. Colliding 
against, 
between, 
being struck  
by 
Being struck by 
moving objects, 
becoming caught 
up/jammed, 
crushed. 
25. Pedestrians being struck by vehicle 
26. Being struck by rolling/sliding objects 
27. Being struck by hand tools held by another person 
28. Being struck by objects held by another person 
29. Being struck by swinging objects 
30. Becoming caught/jammed between objects 
31. Colliding against/with objects 
 
6. Sliding of 
materials 
Becoming  
buried 
32. Buried under loose material 
 
7. Aggression Violence 33. Exposure to aggressive people (violence) 
34. Exposure to the behaviour of animals (falls, bites, stings, 
kicks) 
 
C. What is 
being worked 
on or with; 
8. Technical 
aids 
Being struck by 
moving objects, 
becoming caught 
up/jammed, 
cutting 
35. Being struck by own hand tools 
36. Being struck by moving parts of machinery - operating 
37. Being struck by moving parts of machinery - maintenance 
38. Being struck by moving parts of machinery - preparing 
39. Being struck by moving parts of machinery - cleaning 
 
27 
 
 
Characteristics 
of main risk 
situations 
Subgroup 
of activities 
Subgroup of 
critical events 
Specific hazard sources 
9. Vehicles Traffical events 40. The drivers loss of control over vehicle 
 
10. Electricity Electric shock 41. Contact with electricity – electrical equipment 
42. Contact with electricity – when installing/repairing 
 
11. Heat or 
cold 
Burns 43 Burns - frostbite/burns from cold/hot 
surfaces or naked flames 
44 Fires – combustion from “hot” work 
 
12. Chemical Poisoning, 
etching 
45. Discharge of hazardous chemicals from open containers 
46. Contact with uncovered hazardous chemicals (without 
discharge) 
47 Release of chemical risk from closed containers - 
work/filling/draining 
48 Release of chemical risk from closed containers - without 
transportation 
49. Release of chemical risk from closed containers – when 
closing containers 
50. Release of chemical risk from closed containers – work in 
the proximity of a discharge 
 
13. Lifting, 
heavy loads 
Strain injuries 51. Extreme exertions – heavy lifting 
52. Extreme exertions – inappropriate movements 
 
D: 
Surroundings  
of a 
particularly 
dangerous 
nature. 
14. High 
voltage 
Electric shock 53. Contact with electricity – high voltage cables 
 
15. Fire Fire 54 Fire – flammable and easily combustible substances 
55. Fire – fire extinguishing 
 
16. Lack of 
oxygen and 
water 
Suffocation, 
poisoning 
or drowning 
56. Suffocation/poisoning – work in confined spaces 
57. Suffocation/poisoning – work with respirators 
58. Drowning – work in/under the water or liquids 
59. Drowning – work above/in the proximity of water 
 
17. Explosion Explosion 60. Physical explosion 
61. Chemical explosion – vapour or gas 
62. Chemical explosion - dust 
63. Chemical explosion - explosives 
64. Chemical explosion – exothermic reaction 
 
 
